Foley makes a concise argument, in his OpEd at Jurist on 9/11/07, that it’s not too late for a new investigation, one that assesses individuals’ responsibility, not just “failed policy.” It’s quite clear that this nation is no more secure now than we were on 9/11, even after handing this administration unchecked powers and endless sums of money. This week, a TSA study found “Screeners at Los Angeles International Airport missed about 75% of simulated explosives and bomb parts that Transportation Security Administration testers hid under their clothes or in carry-on bags at checkpoints… At Chicago O’Hare International Airport, screeners missed about 60% of hidden bomb materials that were packed in everyday carry-ons.”
As Benjamin DeMott stated in his Harper’s review of the 9/11 Commission Report ,
The 9/11 Commission Report, despite the vast quantity of labor behind it, is a cheat and a fraud. It stands as a series of evasive maneuvers that infantilize the audience, transform candor into iniquity, and conceal realities that demand immediate inspection and confrontation. Because it is continuously engaged in scotching all attempts to distinguish better from worse leadership responses, the Commission can’t discharge its duty to educate the audience about the habits of mind and temperament essential in those chosen to discharge command responsibility during crises. It can’t tell the truth about what was done and not done, thought and not thought, at crucial turning points. … In the course of blaming everybody a little, the Commission blames nobody—blurs the reasons for the actions and hesitations of successive administrations, masks choices that, fearlessly defined, might actually have vitalized our public political discourse.
We at 911truth.org don’t believe for a moment that the tragic series of events on 9/11 were strictly a “massive security failure.” As Mindy Kleinberg, widow of 9/11 victim Alan Kleinberg, stated in her testimony at the first public hearing held by the 9/11 Commission:
With regard to the 9/11 attacks, it has been said that the intelligence agencies have to be right 100% of the time and the terrorists only have to get lucky once. This explanation for the devastating attacks of September 11th, simple on its face, is wrong in its value. Because the 9/11 terrorists were not just lucky once: they were lucky over and over again.
Nonetheless, as Foley makes clear below, without an investigation with the power to actually determine and assess culpability of responsible parties, the very idea that “increased security and revoked civil liberties are justified in the post-9/11 world” is untenable.
