Fear As A Weapon

THE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ON DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Since antiquity, strategists have advised the use of propaganda and other psychological techniques to spread fear among the enemy in order to bring about his defeat. However, the methods to create and manipulate fear also involve terrorism (sometimes state-sponsored) and may target domestic populations in order to make them receptive or hostile to certain political or economic policies.

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When we think of weapons, our mind most often conjures up images of military hardware. We think of guns and tanks on land, guided missiles and fighter jets in the air, aircraft carriers and submarines in the sea, and satellites in space. But arguably the most effective, the most dangerous and the most secret weapons are those that we cannot see at all. Fear is one of them.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND STRATEGY OF TENSION

Fear can be produced deliberately through a number of techniques. Creating fear is part of the little known area within military and strategic studies called ‘psychological warfare’. Psychological warfare (PSYWAR), is an unusual form of warfare, as it does not physically attack the target group, i.e. ‘the enemy’, in order to destroy them, but the minds of the target group, the psyche.
Leaving aside the fact that philosophers, psychologists, neurologists, yogis and theologians, to this day, have not been able to agree on the definition of ‘the mind’ one can for our purpose here define it simply as our human ability to think and feel.

The target of psychological warfare are thus human thoughts and human feelings. If somebody can get access to our thinking and feeling without us noticing it he undoubtedly can exercise great power. However, once the target has noticed that his psyche is being manipulated through PSYWAR the technique loses much of its effect. This warfare, therefore, relies heavily on secrecy and on the ignorance of the target group.

Psychological warfare played a central role during the Second World War and all wars that followed and was used by military leaders all over the globe. Through the global extension of the media system, during the last decades, the intensity of PSYWAR has greatly increased, as the pictures and texts, circulated widely nowadays are ideally suited to influence our thought and feelings.

Psychological warfare can come in many different and seemingly unrelated forms: As leaflets, books, posters, movies, radio programmes or television reports, all designed to shape the thinking and feeling of the target group. It is therefore sometimes popularly referred to as ‘propaganda’, yet this is imprecise as propaganda is but one variation of psychological warfare. Other less known variations include the ‘strategy of tension’ which targets the emotions of human beings and aims to spread maximum fear among the target group.

A terrorist attack carried out by private or state actors in a public place such as a railway station, a market place or a school bus which necessarily kills innocent civilians is the typical technique through which the strategy of tension is being implemented. Terrorism is psychological warfare, for its aim is to spread maximum ‘terror’, the Latin expression for ‘great fear’.

Terrorism is not only the most brutal but also the most devious version of PSYWAR. Most often it is extremely difficult to find out exactly who sponsored a terrorist attack. In a first set of cases the terrorists themselves claim/own responsibilities shoulder the blame, often adding their political demands to their

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statements. In this case the aim of the terrorists is to instill fear in the government whom they were fighting, most often in order to force them to withdraw troops from a specified area.

“Christian” terrorists including the Catholic Irish Republican Army (IRA) used this technique in their armed campaign directed against British rule in Northern Ireland. IRA attacks on London included a large bomb attack on April 10, 1992 at 30 St Mary Axe killing three people and injuring 91, and a bomb explosion at Victoria Station on February 18, 1991 killing one and injuring 38.

A second set of terrorist operations which also forms part of psychological warfare is, however, more complex. In these cases secret agents of the state, from the military, the intelligence services, or mercenaries hired by either the military or the intelligence services, carry out a terrorist attack and then wrongly blame it on a political enemy of the government. This state-sponsored psychological warfare technique is rather effective, as in most cases state sponsors stay at arm’s length and do not themselves show up at the crime scene, while explosives often destroy most traces.

Whether the terrorist attack has been carried out by a private group such as the IRA, or by secret agents of the state who are fighting a political enemy, the impact of this psychological strategy remains the same: it works directly on the emotions and spreads maximum fear. Terrorism is therefore always a form of psychological warfare. It must be noted that the target of the strategy of tension, are not the dead and the wounded as often assumed, but first the political opponents who are discredited through the attack, and second those who remain unharmed but hear of the attack over the media and fear for their lives and the lives of their beloved ones. For the aim of the strategy is to create fear, not in the few unfortunate dead victims who might number from one to three thousand, but in the millions who survive physically unharmed but emotionally profoundly distressed.

The US Department of Defence defines psychological warfare as: “The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary
purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviour of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.” This definition explicitly names propaganda, the most widely known variation of psychological warfare which for instance includes the dropping of leaflets from a plane over enemy territory. It does, however, not mention the more brutal strategy of tension which also forms part of PSYWAR and in the above definition is implicitly subsumed under “other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviour of hostile foreign groups”. It is worthy of note that the Pentagon definition states that psychological warfare targets the mind—composed of emotions and thoughts—and not the body.

There has been a rapid growth of the ‘politics of fear’ and the use of psychological warfare techniques in the last decades, greatly supported by the development of a global media system which can multiply shock effects. Yet above all, due to the secretive nature of this weapon, scientists have had a hard time to describe the weapon of fear in practical details. Furthermore, not all forms of psychological warfare have received the same attention, leading to a somewhat distorted overall picture. While PSYWAR operations of private Christian and Muslim terrorist groups such as the IRA in Ireland, the Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, Islamic Resistance Movement) in the Gaza strip, or the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) in Spain have been studied and analysed in some detail, “Christian” state-sponsored terrorism remains very much a taboo subject among scientists, in Europe and America, despite the fact that it employs exactly the same weapon—the weapon of fear.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN ITALY

An important breakthrough into Christian state-sponsored terrorism came at the end of the Cold War in Italy in 1990, where judges, parliamentarians and academics together continue to make a great effort to understand and describe the secret strategy. Italian Judge Felice Casson rediscovered the strategy during his investigation into a number of terrorist attacks from which Italy had suffered in the period 1960–1980. According to Casson, the best documented historical case in which the strategy of tension was implemented occurred in the Italian village Peteano. There, on May 31, 1972, three members of the Italian
paramilitary police, the Carabinieri, were lured to an abandoned Fiat 500 by an anonymous phone call and were killed when they opened the hood of the car which triggered a bomb. For many years, this terrorist attack was blamed on the Italian left-wing terror organisation Red Brigades until Casson reopened the case and found that the catholic neo-fascist Vincenzo Vinciguerra, a militant anti-communist, had carried out the crime.

Casson found to his great surprise that neo-fascist Vinciguerra had not operated alone, but under the protection of members of the Italian military secret service. The far-reaching implication of this very rare discovery rested in the fact that Casson could prove the reality of Christian state-sponsored terrorism, arguably the most secretive dimension of psychological warfare.

The Italian military secret service during Italy’s Cold War history had been involved in a number of shadow operations which, when discovered, amidst repeated public protests, forced the secret service to change its label. Created four years after the defeat of Italy in World War II on March 30, 1949, but a few days before Italy became a founding member of NATO, the Italian military secret service first called SIFAR (Servizio Informazioni delle Forze Armate), changed its name to SID (Servizio Informazione Difesa, 1965–1977), and then to its current designation SISMI (Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare).

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Judge Casson found that the SISMI had been at the heart of a number of terrorist attacks in Italy and arrested neo-fascist Vinciguerra, who on trial in 1984 confirmed that it had been relatively easy for him to escape and hide because large segments of the Italian security forces, including the SISMI, had shared his anti-communist convictions, and therefore silently supported crimes that discredited the Italian Left especially the strong Italian Communist Party. After the bombing, Vinciguerra recalled, “A whole mechanism came into action…the Carabinieri, the Minister of the Interior, the customs services, and the military and civilian intelligence services accepted the ideological reasoning behind the attack.” Elements of the Italian state, in other words, supported the terror and thus the politics of fear.
Casson found that by blaming the crime on the left-wing terrorist organisation Red Brigades the political enemy, the strong Italian Communist Party, was being discredited by the Peteano terror and other attacks. The directors of the military secret service and politicians argued, after the crime, that the ‘Communist danger’ justified increased military spending and a reduction of civil liberties in the interest of state security. In this way the strategy of tension, as executed through the Peteano terror attack, spread fear amongst the Italian population, discredited the political opponent and allowed for the implementation of conservative security policies. It was very effective, for nobody knew at the time that the secret services had themselves supported the crime.

“As far as the secret services are concerned the Peteano attack is part of what has been called ‘the strategy of tension’”, Judge Casson explained in a BBC interview to British journalist Peter Marshall in 1991. “That’s to say, to create tension within the country to promote conservative, reactionary social and political tendencies. While this strategy was being implemented, it was necessary to protect those behind it because evidence implicating them was being discovered. Witnesses withheld information to cover right-wing extremists.” (television news program Newsnight on BBC1 on April 4, 1991).

Vinciguerra was a member of the private Italian fascist organisation Ordine Nuovo (New Order) which cultivated close contacts with the Italian military secret service SISMI. A fellow Ordine Nuovo member, Clemente Graziani, explained in a book which he published in 1963 that as Catholics it was their duty to fight the Godless Communists by all means—including “strategy of tension” operations which at first glance seemed brutal and immoral—for the Communists too engaged in dirty tricks and could never be defeated if Ordine Nuovo for moral reasons shied away from using the same methods. “Terrorism obviously has the possibility to kill or let kill also elderly people, women and children”, Graziani noted. “Operations of this kind have until now been considered to be contemptible and despicable crimes, and above all, useless crimes to win a conflict. The revolutionary warfare canon however subverts these humanitarian and moral principles. These forms of terrorist intimidation
are today not only considered as acceptable operations, but are at times even absolutely necessary.” (Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi: Il terrorismo, le stragi ed il contesto storico politico. Redatta dal presidente, Senatore Giovanni Pellegrino, Roma 1995, p.261).

Peteano was not an isolated tragedy in Italy, but part of a long series of terrorist attacks which had started shortly before Christmas on December 12, 1969. On that day four bombs exploded in public places in Rome and Milan, killing 16 and maiming and wounding 80 innocent civilians, most of them on the Piazza Fontana in Milan. After the massacre, according to the rules of the strategy of tension, the Italian military secret service SID had planted bomb parts in the villa of well-known leftist editor Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in order to blame the terror on the Communists and the extreme left, despite the fact that Feltrinelli had absolutely nothing to do with the crime. Only years later was it revealed that the Italian extreme right had carried out the atrocity in order to promote the strategy of tension.

In another terrorist attack on May 28, 1974 a bomb exploded at an anti-fascist rally for which 3000 had gathered in the Italian town of Brescia, killing 8 and injuring and maiming 102 people. To cover the traces of the right-wing bombers the square was cleaned with water hoses before the investigating magistrates could reach the scene of the crime to secure the evidence. An Italian Senate commission later observed that “the investigations immediately after the massacre were characterised by such incredible mistakes that one is left speechless.” On August 4, 1974, yet another bomb exploded on a train, the Rome to Munich ‘Italicus Express’, killing 12 innocent civilians and injuring 48. The most deadly attack followed on Saturday August 2, 1980, a warm and sunny afternoon and the first full day of the Italian national summer holiday, when a massive explosion ripped through the second class waiting room at the Bologna railway station, killing 85 and seriously injuring a further 200.
This series of terrorist attacks discredited the Italian Communists and spread maximum fear among the Italian population as nobody really knew what was going on and who would be killed next. It was impossible to protect the entire transport system, let alone all public places, and thus it was clear to all security experts at the time that democratic western societies would always remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks. “You had to attack civilians, the people, women, children, innocent people, unknown people far removed from any political game”, neo-fascist Vincenzo Vinciguerra after his arrest thus explained the strategy of tension in which he himself had participated. “The reason was quite simple. They were supposed to force these people, the Italian public, to turn to the State to ask for greater security. This is the political logic that lies behind all the massacres and the bombings which remain unpunished, because the State cannot convict itself or declare itself responsible for what happened.”

Judge Felice Casson, who had rediscovered the strategy of tension wanted to know why officials within the Italian government and the secret services had supported this criminal strategy. Following the arrest of Peteano bomber Vinciguerra he decided to dig deep. “I wanted that new light should be shed on these years of lies and mysteries, that’s all. That Italy should for once know the truth.” In the summer of 1990 Casson therefore requested permission from Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to do research in the archives of the SISMI in Rome. Casson made a sensational discovery: He found that under the code name ‘Gladio’—‘Sword’ a secret army existed within the Italian state which had been set up by the SIFAR in close collaboration with the CIA in the years after the Second World War in order to function as a secret guerrilla in the event of a Soviet invasion and occupation of Italy.

The data found by Casson suggested that this mysterious Gladio army was linked to NATO and, in the absence of a Soviet invasion seems to have manipulated Italian politics in a number of psychological warfare operations during the Cold War in order to weaken the Italian Communists. He confidently informed Italian Senators who were greatly surprised and on August 2, 1990 instructed. Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, “to inform the parliament within sixty days with respect to the existence, characteristics and
purpose of a parallel and occult structure that is said to have operated within our secret service of the military with the aim to condition the political life of the country.”

On October 24, 1990, Andreotti handed a ten-page report entitled *The so-called Parallel SID—The Gladio Case* to the Senators, in which he confirmed that a secret army existed within the military secret service SID. He added that it was still active and operational, and that the then Italian President Francesco Cossiga was also aware of its existence. When questioned by the press Cossiga said that he was “proud of the fact that we have kept the secret for 45 years.”

In his report, Andreotti confirmed the findings of Casson and explained that Gladio was the Italian branch of a secret stay-behind army that had been set up after World War II by the CIA and SIFAR as part of an international network of clandestine resistance within NATO countries to confront a potential Soviet invasion. In case of an invasion, the stay-behind armies would have operated behind enemy lines and set up a resistance movement. The secret armies were supervised and coordinated by two secret unconventional warfare centres of NATO named ACC and CPC, as Andreotti revealed: “Once the clandestine resistance organisation was constituted, Italy was called upon to participate ... in the works of the CPC (Clandestine Planning Committee) of 1959, operating within the ambit of SHAPE [NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] ...; in 1964 the Italian secret service also entered the ACC (Allied Clandestine Committee).”(Franco Ferraresi, *A secret structure codenamed Gladio, Italian Politics. A Review*. 1992, p.30).

Amidst sharp protests from the Italian press Andreotti stressed that the Italian military secret service in general, as well as the ‘Gladio’ members in particular, had nothing to do with the terror that Italy had suffered from during the Cold War. Yet Peteano bomber Vinciguerra who had been at the heart of the strategy of tension disagreed with this account. Already in 1984 during his trial he had declared: “With the massacre of Peteano and with all those that have followed, the knowledge should by now be clear that there existed a real live...
structure, occult and hidden, with the capacity of giving a strategic direction to the outrages.” The structure, he said, “lies within the state itself. There exists in Italy a secret force parallel to the armed forces, composed of civilians and military men, in an anti-Soviet capacity, that is, to organise a resistance on Italian soil against a Russian army.” Without revealing the code-name ‘Gladio’ Vinciguerra had clearly been speaking of the secret army many years before Prime Minister Andreotti confirmed these far-reaching claims. Vinciguerra said in 1984 that what he was describing was “a secret organisation, a super-organisation with a network of communications, arms, and explosives, and men trained to use them.” Vinciguerra insisted that this “super-organisation [which], lacking a Soviet military invasion which might not happen, took up the task, on NATO’s behalf, of preventing a slip to the left in the political balance of the country. This they did, with the assistance of the official secret services and the political and military forces.” (Ed Vulliamy, “Secret agents, freemasons, fascists ... and a top-level campaign of political ‘destabilisation’: ‘Strategy of tension’ that brought carnage and cover-up” The Guardian, December 5, 1990).

The Italian press was very critical of the revelations and the fact that the CIA played a central role in the secret operation. The daily La Stampa commented: “No raison d’état could be worth maintaining, covering up, or defending a secret military structure composed of ideologically selected members—dependent upon, or at least under the influence of, a foreign power—that allegedly serves as an instrument of political struggle. It cannot be defined as any less than high treason and an attack on the Constitution.” (As quoted in Franco Ferraresi, ibid).

Above all, the Italian Communist Party, PCI, was convinced that not foreign armies, but they themselves had been the real target of the Gladio armies during the entire Cold War period: “With this mysterious Parallel SID, conjured up to head off an impossible coup by the left, we have seriously risked making a coup d’état by the right possible ... We cannot accept that ... this super-SID was passed off as a military instrument destined to operate ‘in case of enemy occupation’. The true enemy is only and has always been the Italian Communist party, i.e. an internal enemy.” (Norberto Bobbio as quoted in Franco Ferraresi, ibid).

In the US the story was ignored by the mainstream media. In one of the very few articles on the subject the Washington Post on November 14, 1990 under the headline ‘CIA Organised Secret Army in Western Europe. Paramilitary
Force Created to Resist Soviet Occupation’, reported that an unnamed intelligence officer familiar with Gladio had declared that it was “solely an Italian operation. We have no control over it whatsoever.” Adding, that “If there are allegations that the CIA was involved in terrorist activities in Italy, they are absolute nonsense.”

In contrast to the anonymous US intelligence officer in the Washington Post who implicitly blamed the Italians for the terror in their country, researcher Philip Willan in his book Puppetmasters, The political use of terrorism in Italy (London, Constable, 1991) argues that the US government and intelligence community is to blame: “It is by no means easy to determine who was responsible for day-to-day tactical decisions in the running of the strategy of tension. But there can be little doubt that overall responsibility for the strategy lay with the government and the intelligence services of the United States ... questions will remain about the adoption of methods that brought violent death to hundreds of innocent victims.”

Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA from 1977 to 1981, was unwilling to confirm Willan’s claim and strictly refused to answer any questions about Gladio in a television interview in Italy in December 1990. When with regard to the victims of the numerous massacres the Italian journalist wanted to clarify the strategy of tension Turner angrily ripped off his microphone and shouted: “I said, no questions about Gladio!” whereupon the interview was over. (The Independent, December 1, 1990).

Members of the Italian parliament decided to dig deeper. Eight senators, most of whom belonged to the Democratic Left Party (Partito Democratico della Sinistra, PDS), which had replaced the Italian Communist party after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, continued to investigate Gladio and the strategy of tension. Under the chairmanship of Senator Giovanni Pellegrini they heard witnesses, scanned documents, and presented a report of 326 pages in June 2000. The former Communists concluded that—apart from preparing for a Soviet invasion—during the Cold War the secret army had, together with the CIA, the Italian military secret service, and selected Italian neo-fascists fought...
the Italian Communists and the Italian Socialists for fear that the latter would betray NATO ‘from within’. “Those massacres, those bombs, those military actions had been organised or promoted or supported by men inside Italian state institutions and, as has been discovered more recently, by men linked to the structures of United States intelligence”. (Philip Willan, “US supported anti-left terror in Italy”, The Guardian, June 24, 2000).

According to the findings of the Italian Senate the strategy of tension had thus been implemented by members of both the US and Italian national security agencies, including the CIA and the SISMI, which had linked up with extremists who then had planted the bombs. General Giandelio Maletti, former head of Italian counter-intelligence, confirmed this account in March 2001, but a few months before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington DC.

At a trial of right-wing extremists accused to have been involved in the 1969 Piazza Fontana massacre General Maletti testified, “The CIA, following the directives of its government, wanted to create an Italian nationalism capable of halting what it saw as a slide to the left, and, for this purpose, it may have made use of right-wing terrorism … The impression was that the Americans would do anything to stop Italy from sliding to the left”, the General explained and added, “Don’t forget that Nixon was in charge and Nixon was a strange man, a very intelligent politician, but a man of rather unorthodox initiatives.” In retrospect the 79-year-old Maletti offered criticism and regret: “Italy has been dealt with as a sort of protectorate” of the United States. “I am ashamed to think that we are still subject to special supervision.”

THE POSITIONS OF NATO AND THE EU ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The discovery of the NATO stay-behind army in Italy in 1990 and the ensuing controversy about the effects of psychological warfare on international politics had far reaching international implications and led to heated debate among Christian states in Europe and America. As the details of the
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operation emerged The Times on November 19, 1990 concluded that the “story seems straight from the pages of a political thriller”, while The Observer,(November 18, 1990) concluded that Gladio and the strategy of tension was “the best-kept and most damaging, political military secret since World War II”.

By declaring that NATO coordinated the secret international armies of which Gladio was but one branch, Andreotti had put great pressure on the European headquarters of NATO in Belgium. Subsequent research by the author confirmed that different secret armies existed across Western Europe, some of which had links with terrorism. In each country different national code-names were used for the stay-behinds: In Italy Gladio, in Denmark Absalon, in Germany TD BDJ, in Greece LOK, in Luxemburg Stay-Behind, in the Netherlands I&O, in Norway ROC, in Portugal Aginter in Switzerland P26, in Turkey Counter-Guerrilla, and in Austria OWSVG (if Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe, London, Frank Cass, 2005).

NATO, the world’s largest military alliance, reacted with confusion. After almost a month of silence, on Monday November 5, 1990 it categorically denied Andreotti’s allegation concerning their involvement in operation Gladio and the secret armies. Senior NATO spokesman Jean Marcotta said at SHAPE headquarters in Mons, Belgium, that “NATO has never contemplated guerrilla war or clandestine operations; it has always concerned itself with military affairs and the defence of Allied frontiers.” Then, on Tuesday, November 6, a NATO spokesman probably Robert Stratford explained that NATO’s denial of the previous day had been false. The spokesman left journalists with a short communiqué which stated that NATO never commented on matters of military secrecy and that Marcotta should not have said anything at all. (British daily, The European, November 9, 1990).

Following this public relations debacle NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner briefed NATO ambassadors on November 7, 1990 behind closed doors. Wörner himself had been briefed by the highest-ranking military officer of NATO in Europe, US General John Galvin, the acting SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). “During this meeting behind closed doors, the NATO Secretary General related that the questioned military gentleman—precisely General John Galvin—had indicated that SHAPE co-ordinated the Gladio operations. From then on the official position of NATO was that they would not comment on official secrets.” (Spanish daily, El Pais, November 26, 1990).
The parliament of the European Union was not amused that NATO refused to comment and in a special resolution sharply criticised during debates on November 22, 1990, “these organisations [which] operated and continue to operate completely outside the law since they are not subject to any parliamentary control” and “called for a full investigation into the nature, structure, aims and all other aspects of these clandestine organisations.” Such an investigation, however, was never carried out as both NATO and its member states were concerned about a number of problems that it could create. Yet the EU parliament made it clear that it “protests vigorously the assumption by certain US military personnel at SHAPE and in NATO of the right to encourage the establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and operation network”, and there the matter rested.

FIELD MANUAL FM 30-31B DETAILS HOW AND WHEN THE STATE CAN CARRY OUT TERRORIST OPERATIONS. IT SPECIFIES THE METHODOLOGY FOR LAUNCHING TERRORIST ATTACKS IN NATIONS THAT “DO NOT REACT WITH SUFFICIENT EFFECTIVENESS” AGAINST “COMMUNIST SUBLERSION”.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN TURKEY

In Turkey the secret stay-behind army was called ‘Counter-Guerilla’. In its possession researchers found one of the most secret “dirty tricks manual” on psychological warfare. The manual, code-named FM 30–31B, had been written in 1970 during the Vietnam war by US officers and was later given to select members of the Turkish military.

Field Manual FM 30–31B details how and when the state can carry out terrorist operations. It specifies the methodology for launching terrorist attacks in nations that “do not react with sufficient effectiveness” against “communist subversion.”

Ironically, the manual states that the most dangerous moment comes when leftist groups “renounce the use of force” and embrace the democratic process. It is then that “US army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince Host Country Governments and public opinion

The history of FM 30–31B itself is remarkable. The Pentagon document first surfaced in Turkey in 1973 where the newspaper Baris in the midst of a whole range of mysterious acts of violence which shocked Turkish society announced the publication of a secretive US document. Thereafter the Baris journalist who had come into the possession of FM 30–31B disappeared and was never heard of again. Despite the apparent danger Turkish Colonel Talat Turhan two years later published a Turkish translation of the manual and revealed that in Turkey NATO’s secret stay-behind army was codenamed “Counter-Guerrilla” and run by the Special Warfare Department. From Turkey the document found its way to Spain where in 1976 the newspaper Triunfo, despite heavy pressures, published excerpts of FM 30–31B upon the fall of the Franco dictatorship. In Italy on October 27, 1978 excerpts of FM 30–31B were published by the political magazine L’Europeo, whereupon the printed issues of

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the magazine were confiscated. The breakthrough for the document came arguably not in the 1970s, but in the 1980s, when in Italy the secret anticommunist P2 Freemason lodge of Licio Gelli was discovered. Among the documents seized by the Italian police there was also FM 30–31B. The Italian parliamentary investigation into P2 decided to publish FM 30–31B in the appendix of its final public report on P2 in 1987.

Due to its extremely sensitive nature the authenticity of FM 30–31B is of crucial importance. Allan Francovich wanted to know exactly what role psychological warfare techniques, as described by FM 30–31B had played in the past and in his BBC documentary on Gladio and NATO’s secret armies questioned former CIA director William Colby about the sinister FM 30–31B directives. Colby denied that the United States had engaged in such operations in Europe: “I never heard of such a thing. Frankly, I don’t know the origins of the statement—and you can find any statement in any country, I mean you can find jack-ass statements anywhere.” Journalist Francovich also interviewed Ray Cline, CIA Deputy Director from 1962 to 1966, who replied: “Well, I suspect it is an authentic document. I don’t doubt it. I never saw it but it’s the kind of special forces military operations that are described. On the other hand you gotta recall, that the Defense Department and the President don’t initiate any of those orders, until there is an appropriate occasion.” (Allan Frankovich, Gladio: The Foot Soldiers, Third of three Francovich Gladio documentaries, broadcast on BBC2 on June 24, 1992).

CONCLUSION

Those very few scientists who have researched the fields of psychological warfare and published on the subject realise that the weapon of fear is still being used today by a number of international actors in the context of the so-called ‘war on terrorism’. The weapon of fear is still being used today by a number of international actors in the context of the so-called ‘war on terrorism’. Without fear the so-called ‘war on terrorism’ could not succeed. Yet fear cripples the personal development of every human being and promotes violence in human interactions. Therefore all efforts should be made to assess the reality and power of fear as a secret weapon. Thereafter a
conscious decision to monitor one’s own emotions, and particularly one’s fears and those who manipulate them, can allow every human being to break free from the destructive circle of fear and violence. For fear is a dangerous weapon only as long as the target remains ignorant of its real causes and the secret strategy is undetected. In full light it loses its strength and tends to dissolve. Regaining control of one’s own thoughts and emotions, and making a conscious decision to steer clear of fear and hatred, seem therefore, adequate answers to some of the major challenges of the twenty-first century.