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What Was Known Before 9/11?
EXPLORE THE RECORD · PATHWAY 1 OF 7
Before the attacks, U.S. agencies were tracking al-Qaeda, receiving aviation warnings, and holding information about two men who would later become hijackers.
The question is not whether warnings existed. It is what happened to the information.
Withheld Intelligence · Warnings · Financial Activity
Three Ways Into the Evidence
Start with the source that most closely relates to the issue you’re looking to explore.
WITHHELD INTELLIGENCE
The Information That Wasn't Shared
CIA officers tracked Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi through the Kuala Lumpur meeting before the two men entered the United States. The CIA knew Mihdhar held a multiple-entry U.S. visa; in March 2000 it learned that Hazmi had flown to Los Angeles in January.
Why did key U.S.-relevant information fail to reach the FBI investigators who could act on it?
WARNINGS AND FORESEEABILITY
What Was Known About the Threat?
U.S. agencies received multiple warnings about al-Qaeda and possible attacks inside the United States before September 11.
How much was known before September 11?
FINANCIAL ACTIVITY
What Happened in the Markets?
Official investigators examined millions of securities transactions. Later statistical studies identified unusual trading patterns.
What did the trading activity actually show?
Five Key Moments Before 9/11
The record shows substantial warning and information-sharing failures—but not possession of the complete 9/11 operational plan.
JAN 2000
Future hijackers enter the intelligence record
CIA officers tracked Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi through the al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur. In January the CIA knew Mihdhar held a multiple-entry U.S. visa; in March it learned that Hazmi had flown to Los Angeles in January. Key U.S.-relevant information was not contemporaneously passed to FBI Headquarters.
JAN 2000
Mihdhar and Hazmi enter the United States
Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi entered the United States together at Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. Information already held about them did not trigger a domestic search.
2000–2001
Opportunities to locate them were missed
As the two men lived openly in the United States, later intelligence leads and internal communications still failed to produce an effective effort to find them.
SUMMER 2001
Threat reporting surged
Intelligence reporting about an imminent al-Qaeda attack reached extraordinary levels, later described by senior officials as the system “blinking red.”
AUG 6, 2001
The President receives the PDB
The President’s Daily Brief, “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US,” warned that al-Qaeda had maintained a desire to conduct attacks inside the United States and referenced suspicious activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other attacks.
The Mihdhar–Hazmi Intelligence Trail
Before September 11, the CIA possessed significant information about Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. The DOJ Inspector General found that some information about the Malaysia meetings reached the FBI, but key U.S.-relevant pieces did not: Mihdhar’s U.S. visa information was not contemporaneously passed, and the CIA’s later discovery that Hazmi had flown to Los Angeles was not shared with the FBI.
One effort to formally transmit Mihdhar’s visa information became the Central Intelligence Report documented below.
Primary Record
The Mihdhar CIR Was Drafted, Held, and Never Sent
Draft
An FBI agent detailed to the CIA drafted a CIR for FBI
Headquarters and the New York Field Office containing Mihdhar’s
visa and New York destination.
Hold
A CIA desk officer entered the hold instruction at the direction
of the Bin Laden Unit’s deputy chief.
Nondissemination
The report was not released and remained a draft into
mid-February.
Source: DOJ Office of the Inspector General · Chapter Five · Special Report dated November 2004, publicly released June 2005
Read DOJ OIG Chapter Five →The Justice Department inspector general found that the FBI agent had used the prescribed reporting process and that the information was in the appropriate format for passage to the FBI. Investigators found no documentary explanation for why the supervisory hold was imposed.
A report intended to carry the information to the FBI was drafted through the prescribed channel, explicitly placed on supervisory hold, and never sent.
The public record establishes the hold and nondissemination. It does not establish why the hold was imposed or whether anyone above the deputy-chief level approved it.
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT
Richard Clarke: Why wasn’t the White House told?
Former White House counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke said the CIA withheld the Mihdhar–Hazmi information from him and the FBI.
Why it matters: Clarke was the official coordinating White House counterterrorism policy.
“White House Terror Chief Alleges CIA 9/11 Malfeasance…” · Colorado911Visibility.org · Aug. 11, 2011
EVIDENCE REVIEW
Who knew what — and when?
Kevin Fenton examines the chronology behind Clarke’s allegations and compares his account with the documented intelligence trail.
Why it matters: It tests the allegation against the timeline rather than treating one witness as definitive.
“Who Knew What When?” · Kevin Fenton · August 11, 2011
LATER INVESTIGATION · ARCHIVE
The dispute over “Who Is Rich Blee?”
This statement documents the controversy surrounding delayed publication of a film examining CIA officials involved in the pre-9/11 intelligence trail.
Why it matters: It preserves part of the later effort to identify decision points inside the CIA Counterterrorist Center.
Two CIA Employees at the Heart of a Notorious 9/11 Failure Likely Deduced · SecrecyKills.com ·Sep. 14, 2011
WARNINGS AND FORESEEABILITY
Warnings Before September 11
Before September 11, U.S. agencies received warnings involving al-Qaeda, hijackings, aviation threats, and possible attacks inside the United States.
These records do not show that officials possessed the specific 9/11 plot. They do show that aviation-based terrorism and a major al-Qaeda attack were already matters of official concern.
The specific September 11 plot was not predicted in full. But hijacking, aircraft-as-weapons scenarios, and a major al-Qaeda attack inside the United States were already within the range of official concern.
The warnings varied in specificity, reliability and distribution. Foreseeability is not the same as foreknowledge.
ARCHIVE REPORTING
How many hijacking warnings were there?
Government records documented repeated pre-9/11 intelligence reporting involving possible hijackings.
Why it matters: It tests the claim that hijacking threats were outside the range of official concern.
“9/11 Report Cites Many Warnings About Hijackings” · Eric Lichtblau, NY Times · Feb. 5, 2005
DOCUMENT CHECK
Had aircraft-as-weapons scenarios been considered?
Security planning before 9/11 included scenarios involving aircraft attacks on prominent targets.
Why it matters: It allows later claims about what was “unimaginable” to be compared with the historical record.
“Bush, Rice and the Genoa Warning: Documenting a demonstrable falsehood” · 911Truth.org Staff · May 22, 2004
AVIATION SECURITY
What did airport security know before 9/11?
Later reporting documented pre-9/11 security concerns involving suspected extremists, watchlists, and aviation systems.
Why it matters: It moves the issue from general warning to the question of operational prevention.
“Airport Security Ignored pre-911 Warnings on Hijackers” · Paul Sperry · Oct. 15, 2011
FINANCIAL ACTIVITY
Unusual Trading Before September 11
Unusually heavy put-option activity in United Airlines and American Airlines drew immediate investigative attention before and after the attacks.
The SEC’s May 2002 review was substantial. Investigators examined more than 9.5 million securities transactions involving 103 companies and 32 index or fund products, reviewed account records and interviewed traders. The SEC reported finding no trading based on advance knowledge of the attacks.
The underlying records also define an important boundary to that conclusion. The SEC reported that in some overseas cases it could not itself identify or interview the beneficial owners or decision makers and referred those matters to the Justice Department and FBI Financial Review Group. The public record reviewed here does not disclose the final account-level disposition of every one of those referrals.
A later SEC/OCC record also corrected a widely repeated figure concerning United Airlines put options traded on September 6. The earlier figure of 2,075 contracts included a canceled 500-contract sale; the corrected volume was 1,575. The frequently repeated claim that a single 2,000-contract purchase represented 96 percent of that day’s UAL put volume should therefore not be treated as settled.
The strongest public record now shows a substantial SEC review and documented FBI follow-up in which investigators reported no identified trading based on advance knowledge. It also shows limits in offshore-account follow-up and leaves some account-level dispositions outside the publicly inspectable record.
What remains unresolved: Statistical abnormality does not identify a trader, a source of information or a connection to the attacks. The remaining evidentiary question is narrower: whether the referred accounts and beneficial owners that cannot presently be traced through the public files were fully resolved in records that have not been released.
EVIDENCE REVIEW
What did investigators find — and not resolve?
911Truth.org compares the official investigation with later academic research, separating documented transactions from claims that remain unproven.
Why it matters: It shows where the official inquiry ended and where later statistical findings raised additional questions.
“Unusual Trading Before 9/11: What the Studies Found—and What Investigators Did Not Publicly Resolve” · 911Truth.org Staff · Aug. 3, 2026
ACADEMIC EVIDENCE
Did the trading patterns indicate informed trading?
Kevin Ryan reviews the academic research, including Allen Poteshman’s analysis of unusual pre-9/11 options activity.
Why it matters: The statistical studies test whether the observed trading departed significantly from normal market behavior.
“Evidence for Informed Trading on the Attacks of September 11” · Kevin Ryan · Nov 26, 2010
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING
What did further investigation uncover?
Lars Schall examines the trading record, the financial institutions involved, and questions surrounding how the transactions were investigated.
Why it matters: It looks beyond the statistical anomaly to the institutions, accounts, and investigative trail behind the trades.
“Insider trading 9/11 … the facts laid bare” · Lars Schall · Mar 25, 2012
CONTINUE THE RECORD
What happened when the attacks began?
The warnings and intelligence record leads directly into the morning of September 11: how the four flights were recognized, how information moved through civilian and military channels, and how command authorities responded.
Continue to Pathway 2: